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To “Advice and ConsentDelay”: The Role of 
Interest Groups in the Confirmation of Judges to 
the Federal Courts of Appeal  
Donald E. Campbell* 
ABSTRACT: 
Political and partisan battles over nominees to the federal courts of appeal have 
reached unprecedented levels. This article considers the reasons for this change in the 
process. Using evidence from law and political science, this article proposes that current 
confirmation struggles are greatly influenced by increased involvement of interest groups 
in the process. The article tests the role of interest groups through an in-depth examina-
tion of George W. Bush’s nomination of Leslie H. Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Utilizing the Southwick case study, the article provides evidence of how interest 
groups impact the confirmation process by designating certain nominees as “controver-
sial.” The article proposes that the “controversial” label impacts how senators and the 
public view particular nominees and has had a direct and significant impact on the fate 
of nominees. Specifically, interest groups shift the incentives of individual senators, 
prompting senators to utilize institutional tools of delay in an effort to defeat nominees. 
The conclusion is that only structural changes adopted by the Senate as a whole—such as 
setting strict time limits on addressing nominations, or eliminating the filibuster for judi-
cial nominees— can resolve the politicalization of the confirmation process.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2011, Justices Scalia and Breyer appeared before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, at a hearing entitled “Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution 
of the United States.”1 During the course of that hearing, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-
SC) bemoaned the fact that during his time in the Senate it had become more difficult to 
get a nominee through the confirmation process.2 When Graham asked if either of the 
Supreme Court Justices believed that the changing nature of the process had a chilling 
impact on the ability to recruit judicial nominees, both Scalia and Breyer replied that they 
believed it did.3 This exchange demonstrates how both the legislative and judicial branch-
es have taken notice of the nature of the current confirmation process. This Article pro-
vides an in-depth examination of how the confirmation process currently operates for 
those nominees considered “controversial” by examining President George W. Bush’s 
nomination of Leslie H. Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Article’s 
larger purpose is to formulate an empirical and theoretical framework for how senators 
evaluate nominees, to understand why the system has evolved into the current partisan-
based process, and to propose how the system can be modified to move away from a de-
lay-plagued process. 
The Article begins in Part II with an examination of changes in the nature of the 
confirmation process over time from an essentially deferential patronage-based selection 
process to a more ideological and partisan process where interest groups have increasing-
ly become involved and influential. Part III sets out the methodology that will be used to 
examine the confirmation of Leslie H. Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Part IV examines in detail the confirmation experience of Southwick, and also includes a 
theoretical explanation of the involvement of interest groups. The article concludes in 
Part V with a discussion of how interest group involvement in the confirmation process 
has resulted in a change in the incentives of senators, and provides some suggestions for 
modifying the process to change these institutional incentives.  
II. THE RISE OF THE CONTESTED JUDICIAL NOMINEE 
The U.S. Constitution divides the task of selecting federal judges between the Pres-
ident and the Senate. The President is charged with nominating judicial officers, while the 
Senate confirms nominees by providing “advice and consent.”4 This arrangement was a 
compromise between large and small states in the Constitutional Convention.5 Beyond 
this general division of authority, the Constitution provides no further guidance on what it 
means for the Senate to provide the required “advice and consent.”6                                                                                                                                                                                      1 Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States Before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Senator Lindsey Graham). 2 Id. at 24.  3 Id. at 24-25.  4  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 5  The large states favored a strong executive and argued in favor of Presidential selection of judges without legislative approval. The small states, seeking as much influence for individual states as pos-sible, sought to have the Senate alone select judges. See Felix A. Nigro, Senate Confirmation, 42 GEO. L.J. 241, 242 (1953). 6 While the Constitution provides no explicit guidance on what it means to provide “advice and con-sent,” the drafters of the Constitution attempted to create a judiciary in which judicial independence  
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The ambiguity of the constitutional division of authority has led to much debate 
about the nature of input the Senate should have in the process of seating life-tenured 
judges. Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 76 that the involvement of the Senate 
would provide “an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would 
tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from 
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.”7 This quote, 
among others from the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state 
ratifying debates, has led some scholars to argue that the Senate’s role should be limited 
to evaluating a nominee’s objective qualifications. 8 Others, citing the same language, 
have argued that the obligation to provide “advice and consent” authorizes the Senate to 
delve deeper than mere qualifications, and justifies inquiry into a nominee’s ideology and 
judicial philosophy (i.e., how a nominee will decide particular issues if confirmed).9 Still 
others have argued that the real test should be a nominee’s “moral instincts” as opposed 
to judicial philosophy.10 Such ambiguity and uncertainty has led to shifts in the nature of 
the Senate’s involvement in the process over time.11 
Until recently, the debate over the role of the Senate in the confirmation process has 
focused on confirmation battles of nominees to the United States Supreme Court.12 The   was a primary concern. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Matthew Madden, Note, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power to Nominate, 93 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1139–44 (2007). 7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton predicted that the President, knowing the Senate would be a check on his nominations, would select individuals based on merit (and not other improper considerations such as favoritism, etc.). Therefore, he states that it is “not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled.” From the Senate side, Hamilton felt that the Senate would confirm a proper selection from the President because there was no way for the Senate to be sure that subsequent nominees would be any more acceptable and they would be hesitant to reject a nominee and “cast a kind of stigma . . . upon the judgment of the chief magistrate . . .” 8 See Randall R. Rader, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Critical Aspect of the Confirmation Process, 77 KY. L.J. 767, 815 (1988) (“the Senate must elect to exercise its check only in those rare instances in history where the President has clearly overstepped the bounds of appropriate discretion in the ap-pointment process”). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that “the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive,” would not hesitate to impeach officers the Sen-ate previously confirmed).  9 In this way the Senate provides what Hamilton describes as an “excellent check” on the executive branch in THE FEDERALIST NO. 76. Richard D. Freer, Advice? Consent? Senatorial Immaturity and the 
Judicial Selection Process, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 502 (1988) (arguing that the Founders envisioned a “bold role” for the Senate in the confirmation process); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation 
Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1991) (“it is my view that senators may reasonably inquire into and base their final decision to confirm or reject presidential choices on factors other than the nominees' personal and professional qualifications. Senators may legitimately ask nominees about their political and judicial  ideology . . . . ”). See also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1207 (1988) (“a nominee may be rejected on the basis of statesmanship, prudence, common sense, and politics, rather than constitutional right and duty. Therefore, a nominee may be rejected without the Senate having to establish humiliating propositions, such as that the nominee is a dangerous radical”). 10 Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (1988). 11 Marcus E. Hendershot, From Consent to Advice and Consent: Cyclical Constraints Within the District 
Court Appointment Process, 63 POL. RES. Q. 328 (2008).  12 Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381 (2010); Jef-frey A. Segal, Albert D. Cover & Charles M. Cameron, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices:  
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Supreme Court garners such attention because of its uniquely important status—including 
its discretionary docket and focus on salient policy issues, its infrequent vacancies, and its 
highly visible nomination and confirmation process. Senators have been particularly in-
terested in exercising their constitutional right of advice and consent when it comes to 
Supreme Court vacancies. Since George Washington, the confirmation of justices to the 
Supreme Court has been viewed as the appropriate venue for partisan13 and institutional 
fights14 over the judicial philosophy of the country’s highest court. 
A. Lower Court Nominations as Patronage Positions 
Lower federal courts have been viewed differently. Historically these were largely 
patronage positions doled out by presidents in consultation with (and at times at the direc-
tion of) senators of the state where the vacancy occurred.15 As discussed above, because 
the Constitution gave no guidance on precisely what it meant to provide “advice” and 
how much or what type of scrutiny was contemplated by congressional “consent,” a pro-
cess arose in which senators shifted the power balance of confirmation struggles to the 
legislative branch.16 Recognizing that a presidential selection without Senate confirmation 
dooms the nomination, senators adopted formal and informal rules to protect the rights of 
senators (and by extension the Senate) to govern approval of nominees. These tools in-
clude senatorial courtesy (recently enforced through the use of the “blue slip”), the hold, 
the filibuster, and the ability to schedule hearings both in the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and on the floor of the Senate.    
The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 77 KY. L.J. 485, 487 n.9 (1988) (collecting sources). 13See JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 26–31 (1995). George Washing-ton's nomination of John Rutledge as Chief Justice failed due to partisan opposition to his speaking out against the Jay Treaty. See also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES & PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985).  14 Jeffrey Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998 (1987). 15 Joseph Harris, The Courtesy of the Senate, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 36, 37–38 (1952) (“[T]he custom of permit-ting the senators of the party in office to select the persons for federal appointment in their own states results in political and often in patronage appointments. The actual selections are frequently made by party leaders rather than by senators, and these federal offices are commonly used to re-ward party workers or the supporters of the senators. In the past, unqualified persons have often received the necessary political sponsorship and have been appointed.”). See also Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 277 (1996) (“[P]rior to Carter lower court nominations and confirmations were more routine. Norms of senatorial courtesy in recruitment and confirmations were quite strong and there is some evidence that the Justice Department deferred many lower court nomination decisions to senators.”). 16 There is some irony in this occurrence. In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton states that one justification for placing the appointment power in the hands of the President was to avoid the type of log-rolling that would inevitably occur in the legislative branch. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). In commenting on why it was a bad idea for the Senate to appoint judges (and other officers), Hamilton notes that “the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: ‘Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.’ . . .  And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party ne-gotiations.” Id. The norm of senatorial courtesy that developed in the Senate, which shifted the bal-ance of power in the judicial nomination process to the Senate, proved Hamilton to be prescient. 
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Historically, the tool providing individual senators the most power is senatorial 
courtesy, a process in which a senator will defer to the opinions of home-state senators 
with regard to judicial vacancies in the senator’s state, with the expectation that such def-
erence will be reciprocated when vacancies arise in the supporting senator’s state: 
It is, of course, exceedingly helpful to a senator to be able to reward sup-
porters with good posts in the federal government. Conversely, it is enor-
mously damaging to a senator’s prestige if a president of his own party ig-
nores him when it comes to making an appointment from or to the sena-
tor’s own state. What is even more damaging to a senator’s prestige and 
political power is for the president to appoint to a high federal office 
someone who is known back home as a political opponent of the senator. 
It was easy for senators to see that if they joined together against the pres-
ident to protect their individual interests in appointments, they could to a 
large degree assure that the president could only make such appointments 
as would be palatable to them as individuals. Out of such considerations 
grew the custom of “senatorial courtesy.”17 
Historically, if a senator objected to a President’s nomination to a judicial opening in a 
senator’s state,18 the senator merely needed to state that the nominee was “personally ob-
noxious” to invoke senatorial courtesy and defeat the nomination.19 Since the early twen-
tieth century, the norm of senatorial courtesy has been enforced through the blue slip pro-
cess.20 The blue slip procedure operates at the level of the Judiciary Committee:  
When a judicial nomination is made, the Chair of the Judiciary Committee 
sends “blue slips” (so called because of the color of the paper used) to the 
senators of the nominee’s home state. If even one senator declines to re-
turn the slip, then the nomination is dead in the water, or further action 
will be extremely difficult, depending on the practice the Committee Chair 
decides to follow.21 
While blue slip deference is an informal mechanism that the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee can choose not to follow, there are strong individual and institutional pres-
                                                                                                                                                                                     17 HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972). 18 Or a seat on a court of appeal traditionally associated with a particular state. 19 JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 215–37 (1953). See also Harris, supra note 15, at 39 (“An objection to a nominee does not mean that the nominee is actually 'personally obnoxious' to the objecting senator; it frequently involves no animus whatever, but merely indicates that the sen-ator has another candidate.”).  20 Sarah A. Binder, Where Do Institutions Come From? Exploring the Origins of the Senate Blue Slip, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1 (2007) (Blue Slip process became institutionalized in approximately 1913 as a way to determine the home-state Senator's position on a nominee to eliminate uncertainty about the opposition a nominee will receive early in the process). 21 Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218, 220 (2002). 
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sures to adhere to the process.22 For example, when Orrin Hatch (R-UT) became Chair of 
the Judiciary Committee in 2001, he threatened to move forward with the judicial nomi-
nees of President George W. Bush despite the opposition of home-state Democratic sena-
tors. This caused an uproar among the Democrats—and resulted in threats to block all of 
Bush’s nominees.23 The likely showdown was averted when Vermont Senator Jim Jef-
fords left the Republican Party to become an Independent (caucusing with the Demo-
crats), shifting control of the Senate to the Democrats.24 In 2003, with Republicans re-
claiming control of the Senate, Hatch followed through with his threat to reject blue slip 
deference—resulting in Democratic filibusters of Bush nominees.25 
In addition to the tool of senatorial courtesy, while a nomination is pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, members of the Committee can request a delay of the 
vote on a nominee, which is traditionally honored. While this request for delay will typi-
cally not kill a nomination, it does give additional time for opponents (or supporters) of 
the nominee to seek additional votes, and indicates that the nominee may face opposition. 
Once a nominee makes it to the floor of the Senate, any senator may engage in a filibuster 
of the nominee. To end the filibuster, sixty senators must vote to invoke cloture and end 
debate. Mustering sixty votes for a filibustered nominee can be a difficult task. Finally, 
any senator can place a “hold” on a nominee. The hold has historically been a method 
which allowed additional time for senators to “conduct research, prepare for debate, or 
accommodate busy schedules.”26 Today, however, placing a hold can indicate intent of a 
senator to filibuster, and can essentially kill the nomination.27 
There are two additional institutional tools available to the majority party in the 
Senate. The first is at the level of the Judiciary Committee. The Chairman of the Commit-
tee has the power to determine which nominations receive hearings and ultimately a vote. 
Of course, a nominee who receives no vote in the Judiciary Committee does not have an 
opportunity to reach the floor of the Senate. In addition, the majority leader of the Senate 
determines if and when a nomination—once out of the Judiciary Committee—will re-
ceive a vote on the floor of the Senate. These scheduling powers provide two additional 
points of delay or defeat for a nomination. 
It is understandable that because of the institutional constraints faced by Presidents 
in getting their nominee confirmed they have an incentive to consult with senators when                                                                                                                                                                                      22 AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER THE BENCH: SENATORS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND LOWER COURT CONFIRMATIONS 56 (2010) (“[T]he predominant reason for the invocation of senatorial courtesy is institutional. Insti-tutional senatorial courtesy reflects the ongoing struggle between the legislative branch and the ex-ecutive branch over the power to select judges and over what the Senate’s constitutional advice and consent role truly encompasses. Institutional senatorial courtesy arises when senators believe they have not been adequately consulted about nominations to vacancies in their state, and so senators call on their colleagues to support their institutional claim to the power to select judicial nominees.”). 23 Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Press Bush for Input on Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2001. 24 John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process Under Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 21–22 (2003). 25Id. at 25–26. 26 LAUREN COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 45 (2002). 27Id. (“Beginning in the late 1960s, the number of requests for holds began to increase, and today senators use requests to hold legislation hostage, seek revenge, or embarrass political enemies.”). 
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deciding whom to nominate to ensure that the nominee goes through the confirmation 
process as smoothly as possible.28 Therefore, for most of the nation’s history, the nomina-
tion and confirmation of lower federal court judges has been a negotiation process be-
tween the President and home-state senators—with both knowing where the other stood 
on a nominee—with little outside influence in the process. 
B. The Rise of Interest Group Involvement in the Confirmation Process 
In recent times, however, the confirmation process has changed. Presidents have 
started to see the appointment of lower federal court judges as an opportunity to establish 
an ideological legacy.29 Because the Supreme Court decides very few cases, the lower 
federal courts (and particularly the courts of appeal) have become the courts of last resort 
for almost all litigants. President Reagan, while not the first President to consider ideolo-
gy as the primary factor in these lower court judicial appointments, established the trend 
that all subsequent presidents have followed.30 
 Why the shift from selection based on negotiation and patronage to ideology? 
Scherer argues that the change has occurred for two primary reasons.31 First, there has 
been a shift in the nature of party politics. Under the old party system (through the mid 
1960s), the party structure was a loose association of local party activists. These activists 
were particularly interested in the spoils that successful elections brought, and were not 
ideological purists who demanded the same from lower court nominees.32 In addition,                                                                                                                                                                                      28 President Johnson supposedly said when dealing with nominees, that the Senate was divided into “whales” and “minnows” and the key was to negotiate with the few whales, and the President could expect the minnows to fall into line. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 19 (1994). See also Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme 
Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999) (setting out a spatial model indicating how Presidents consider the ideology of the Senate in propos-ing Supreme Court nominees).  29 Hartley et al., supra note 15. 30 Prior presidents certainly appreciated the importance of ideology—including Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon—but the emphasis on ideology became a lasting and systematic consideration of judicial selection at all levels after the defeat of President Reagan Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork in 1987. Judge Rader notes three unique aspects of the Bork confirmation pro-cess: “[F]irst, the abandonment of most self-imposed restraints on the nature and purpose of the in-quiries; second, the expansion in terms of length and repetitiveness of the inquiry process; and third, 
an element out of the control of the Senate but influenced by the nature of the Senate proceedings, the 
use of direct political grassroots campaigning and mass media advertising to shape public opinion on 
the nomination and affect the outcome.” Rader, supra note 8, at 807 (emphasis added). For a discus-sion of how presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan selected judicial nominees, 
see generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). 31 It should be noted that an institutional condition leading to an increase in interest group involve-ment was passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. This Amendment resulted in senators’ constituencies moving from state legislators to the state citizens. Such a change laid the foundation for the interest group involvement that would arise later. See Melone, supra note 9, at 73 (“[The pas-sage of the Seventeenth Amendment] may have made senators more sensitive to interest group and grassroots awareness of judicial policymaking”).  32 NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 11–12 (2005). 
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because the parties themselves were heterogeneous (e.g., the divide between Northern 
and Southern Democrats), an ideological test for nominees was impossible.33 This began 
to change in the 1960s as the parties became more homogenous and unwilling to com-
promise on issues of ideology.34 
In addition to a change in parties, there was also a shift in the types of cases that 
federal courts addressed. Whereas prior to the 1950s, the federal courts addressed primar-
ily property and business claims, beginning in the 1950s the Court broadened the types of 
cases on its agenda, including social issues related to the right to privacy and civil rights 
and liberties.35 With the combination of homogenous political parties and a changing fed-
eral court docket, activists insisted that lower federal court nominees—who would be 
interpreting and implementing the new rights adopted by the Supreme Court—be ideo-
logically compatible.36 
This shift in the nature of judicial selection and confirmation changed the complex-
ion of the process. It meant that nominees who in the past would have been selected on 
patronage-based qualifications were instead vetted and selected based on their ideological 
purity, and senators began to oppose certain nominees to “score points” with interest 
groups and political activists whose interests had prompted them to become involved in 
the confirmation process.37 Changes in the party structure and the Supreme Court’s docket 
coincided with technological changes that modified senatorial incentives. Beginning in 
the late 1950s, the increasing prevalence of television coverage began to provide junior 
senators opportunity (and incentive) to go against the norms of deference in the Senate to 
pursue their own ideological goals.38 In addition, the rise of interest group involvement 
prompted individual senators to look outside the Senate body for direction in addressing 
confirmations.39 
This partisan-based shift in the confirmation process placed a strain on the institu-
tion-protecting norms within the Senate. While opposition senators were willing to defer 
to patronage-based nominees, they became increasingly unwilling to defer to ideological-                                                                                                                                                                                     33 Id. at 12. 34 Id. See also NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS 30–31 (1976) (“Purists consider the stock-in-trade of the politician—compromise and bargaining, conciliating the opposition, bending a little to capture support—to be hypocritical; they prefer a style that relies on the announcement of principles and on moral codes.”). 35 See generally CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1998). See also Thomas P. Lewis, Commentary 
on Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 77 KY. L. J. 539, 544 (1988) (“If it is perceived that the Court simply reaches results on the basis of what the justices believe is fair—on issues that touch so many of us—without any other basic restraints, it is obvious that constituencies will develop around certain types of nominees and marshal their forces to sway the Senate. The Senate will have less and less choice about the wisdom of thoroughly politicizing the confirmation process.”). 36 SCHERER, supra note 32, at 13–21. See also J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 10 (1981) (“Lower federal courts, their discretion stretched to implement broad decrees, resemble administrative agen-cies. They oversee great public enterprises in education, housing, and economic development. They also serve as ombudsmen for relief of official abuse. And in the process of enlarging their sphere of influence federal judges have enlarged their political risks.”). 37 SCHERER, supra note 32, at 23. Scherer calls the strategies used to score points with these political activists “elite mobilization strategies.” 38 BELL, supra note 26, at 43. 39 BELL, supra note 26, at 44.  
Vol. 8:1]  Donald E. Campbell  
9  
ly based nominees.40 The question is how to observe and measure this changing process 
with regard to courts of appeal nominees.  
C. Understanding the Change in the Confirmation Process for Court of Appeals Nomi-
nees 
It is clear that the lower court confirmation process is different from what occurs at 
the Supreme Court level. While Supreme Court nominees almost always receive a floor 
vote and can expect to receive varying amounts of opposition, lower court nominees are 
less likely to make it to the Senate floor for a vote. But those who do make it are over-
whelmingly confirmed, often by a voice vote or without any significant opposition.41 For 
example, between 1985 and 2004, of the 284 nominations to the federal courts of appeal, 
192 received floor votes, none of the nominees who made it to the Senate floor were de-
feated, and 170 were confirmed unanimously or with only one “no” vote.42 Figure 1 sets 
out the percentage of confirmed lower federal court judges for Presidents Truman through 
George W. Bush, and demonstrates two points. First, the percentage of judicial nominees 
(both district court and court of appeals nominees) who are ultimately confirmed is very 
high. Second, although the percentage confirmed remains high, the Table indicates that 
the trend line begins decreasing during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. 








The overwhelming percentage of successful nominees may create the perception of a lack 
of opposition, but this is incongruent with the changing nature of the process, where the 
political battles over some nominations reach a fevered pitch.43 This discrepancy has led                                                                                                                                                                                      40 STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 7–8 (“These changes in how presidents approached the selection of lower court nominees subsequently led to a transformation in how the Senate processed these nomi-nations. Senators grew dismayed at the reduction in their power to select nominees, as well as con-cerned by the increasing political and ideological tenor of the resulting appointments, and they began to screen nominations to the federal bench more carefully.”). 41 Garland W. Allison, Delay in Senate Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 8, at 9 (1996). 42 Nancy Scherer, Brandon Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest 
Groups in the Lower Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1027 (2008). 43 Allison, supra note 41, at *8; Hartley et al., supra note 15, at 277. 
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scholars to go behind the scenes to discover how opposition impacts lower court nomi-
nees. They discovered that the fight over lower court judges most often occurs not in the 
floor vote—but in pre-floor procedures. Utilizing procedural tools available to them such 
as senatorial courtesy, holds, and scheduling decisions, senators were delaying considera-
tion of nominees they opposed.44 
Delay can occur between the time of the vacancy and a presidential nomination.45 It 
can also occur between the time of the nomination and confirmation.46 To demonstrate the 
impact that delay has had on the process, the average number of days for a court of ap-
peals nominee to be confirmed rose from 33.3 days for President Carter’s nominees to 
305.4 days during the first two years of George W. Bush’s first term.47 This evidence of 
delay fits into the declining Senate norms discussed above. As senators began to seek 
increased media exposure and to satisfy special interests, the traditional patronage-based 
approach—which relied on the norms associated with an ingrained system of seniority in 
the Senate—began to fail. Taking its place was a politically charged system of delay.48 
Delay is particularly effective at providing an opportunity for attention and extended op-
position: “[d]rawing the proceedings out over time permits the opposition to organize, 
new information to be discovered, the public to be aroused.”49 
 Evidence demonstrating a shift to a longer and more contentious confirmation 
process for some nominees, while important itself, only presents half the story. After all, 
not every lower court nominee faces opposition and long delay. To complete the story, it 
is necessary to delve into the nature of the senatorial opposition. There are a number of 
reasons that a senator may delay a nominee. Often opposition has nothing to do with the 
nominee. Instead, a senator may delay a nominee in retaliation for how other nominees 
were treated, or to gain leverage in a dispute unrelated to the nominee.50 Opposition based 
on these factors, while important, is beyond the scope of this article.  
This article is particularly interested in those nominees opposed on the basis of the 
nominee’s ideology. This type of opposition—especially by non-home-state senators—is 
interesting to study because it seems to be illogical when considered in a Mayhewian                                                                                                                                                                                      44 Lauren Cohen Bell, Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary, 55 POL. RES. Q. 589 (2002); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy, 29 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2004); Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper & Steven R. Van Winkle, To Advise and Con-
sent: The Senate and Lower Federal Court Nominations, 1977-1998, 64 J. POL. 337 (2002) (delay in confirmation is exacerbated by divided government, nomination in the last year of a president's term, and nominations that occur after the Bork nomination). 45 Tajuana D. Massie, Thomas G. Hansford & Donald R. Songer, The Timing of Presidential Nominations 
to the Lower Federal Courts, 57 POL. RES. Q. 145 (2004) (finding that presidents delay putting forth judicial nominees to the district courts and courts of appeal when institutional constraints such as control of the Senate make it unlikely the President will be successful in nominating someone that shares the President’s policy preferences). 46 Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190 (2002); David C. Nixon & David L. Goss, Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, 29 AM. POL. RES. 246 (2001). 47 Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal 
Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 695, 709, 711 (2003). 48 BELL, supra note 26, at 45. 49 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 23. 50 STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 49–94. 
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sense: Why would a senator expend resources to oppose a judicial nominee who does not 
decide cases from the senator’s state, and who will not decide cases that involve the sena-
tor’s constituents?51 For a senator who is primarily interested in reelection, using scarce 
resources and political capital to oppose a judicial nominee whose job will not impact the 
senator’s constituents runs counter to the traditional understanding of congressional mo-
tivations.52 
To understand this puzzle, it is useful to consider the decision-making process of a 
nominee through the lens of the consensus mode of policy decision-making developed by 
Kingdon.53 First, when no controversy arises, a senator’s inclination is to “vote with the 
herd” and approve the nominee.54 This go-along-to-get-along attitude is necessary be-
cause of the numerous obligations on senators’ time and resources. The lack of opposition 
indicates to the senator that he or she will face no consequences for an affirmative vote.55 
The response changes, however, when a controversy is triggered in a senator’s “field of 
forces,” including the senator’s personal attitude about the issue/nominee under consider-
ation and the position of constituents, interest groups, or fellow trusted senators.56 When a 
policy becomes controversial, the senator will evaluate how many and which forces in his 
or her field conflict and, based upon the number and weight of the opposing fields, decide 
how to proceed.57 
The study by Scherer and colleagues’ study of controversial court of appeals nomi-
nees fits nicely into the Kingdon model.58 They identify the increase in the involvement 
of interest groups in the process as a justification for a senator opposing a nominee. To 
put this in the terms of the Kingdon model, interest group involvement causes senators to 
move from the herd and justifies expressing opposition to a nominee.59 In interviews with 
leaders of several interest groups, Scherer and her colleagues found that during the presi-
dency of George W. Bush, liberal interest groups actively researched every nominee to 
both the federal district court and courts of appeals. When these groups uncovered some-
thing they considered problematic (i.e., information indicating that the nominee might 
vote against the group’s policy positions), they would share the information, “first with 
sympathetic senators on the Judiciary Committee, and later, with sympathetic senators                                                                                                                                                                                      51 DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974). Mayhew famously hypothesized that members of Congress are “single minded seekers of reelection,” and that their actions are taken to further this goal. Id. Mayhew proposes three primary activities that members of congress engage in to obtain this goal: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Id. at 73.  52 Id. 53 JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DECISIONS 229–41(1973). 54 Id. at 230. 55 Id. (“On final passage of numerous bills, and on some amendments, the congressman simply sees no conflict in his environment at all; he often does not even bother to look further into the matter . . . given the terrific press for time and the competition among various matters for his attention, there is little point to studying matters over which there is no controversy.”). 56 Id. at 232. 57 Id. at 234–35. 58 See Segal et al., supra note 12, at 491 (discussing the consensus model in the context of Supreme Court nominees). 59 The interest groups in this scenario play the role of “opposition entrepreneurs” seeking to prompt Senators to “see controversy and to scrutinize nominees closely.” Glen S. Krutz, Richard Fleisher & Jon R. Bond, From Abe Fortas to Zöe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 871, 878 (1998). 
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throughout the chamber . . . .”60 Interest groups may also go public with their opposition, 
writing op-ed pieces and encouraging their members to actively oppose a nominee.  
Interest groups thus prompt senators to abandon the presumption-of-confirmation 
that occurs when they adhere to the norm of senatorial courtesy, and move senators into a 
defensive mode, more willing to examine (and challenge) a particular nominee. The in-
terest group’s action has been described as sounding a “fire alarm” that senators heed, 
“because interest groups represent the views of key constituents in the two major par-
ties—constituents who not only care about the make-up of the lower federal courts but 
who also are the most mobilized voters—senators are reluctant to ignore the views ex-
pressed by interest groups.”61 Add to this the fact that interest groups impact fundraising, 
and the question of why senators choose to become involved in lower court confirmation 
battles becomes clearer.62 
Interest group opposition can have substantive implications for a judicial nominee. 
When interest groups do not raise the alarm, senators will routinely and relatively quickly 
confirm a nominee. On the other hand, when an alarm is sounded, the nominee’s chances 
of confirmation go down significantly: “ . . . unopposed nominations experience a 0.85 
probability of confirmation, nominees opposed by conservative groups a 0.78 probability 
of confirmation (a change of 0.07) and nominees opposed by liberal groups a 0.52 proba-
bility of confirmation (a change of 0.33).”63 In short, the presence of interest group oppo-
sition can trigger a sympathetic senator to view the nominee as controversial and worth 
opposing to score points with interest groups and party activists who could impact the 
senator’s reelection. Once a senator perceives the nominee as controversial, the senator is 
willing to utilize institutional tools of opposition, delay, or both, resulting in a delay in 
confirmation or a reduced likelihood of the nominee’s being confirmed. 
D. The Nature of Interest Group Opposition: Agenda Setting and Framing 
 The fact that interest group involvement has changed the nature of confirmations 
raises additional questions. For example, how do interest groups become involved and 
what impact do they have on the process? During the presidencies of Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush, there were 167 individuals nominated to the courts of appeals; only fif-
ty-five (thirty-three percent) were considered “controversial” and actively opposed by 
interest groups.64 Furthermore, of those fifty-five, only twenty-five were not confirmed.65                                                                                                                                                                                      60Scherer et al., supra note 42, at 1028. 61Id. at 1029. See also Segal et al., supra note 12, at 506 (1988) (presenting empirical evidence that ideologically distant senators will play a significant role in the senator's vote on a Supreme Court nominee only when there is a factor in addition to ideology to trigger opposition such as the fact that “the nominee is of less than sterling quality or the political environment is hostile to the president”). 62 BELL, supra note 26, at 52 (interest group incentives “are both electoral and financial; with their ability to educate and mobilize the grass roots, interest groups make senators’ constituents aware of impending confirmation decisions. PACs frequently use their campaign-financing role to provide in-centives to senators who act on the confirmation in the way desired”). See also Scherer, supra note 32, at 25–26 (2005) (discussing actions that National Organization for Women (NOW) would be willing to take, including contacting donors, to make sure that their opposition to a judicial candidate was made clear). 63Scherer et al., supra note 42, at 1035. 64 To identify those nominees who are considered “controversial,” the article uses the convention developed by Scherer et al. A nominee is considered controversial if she is publicly opposed by at  
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The seemingly low number of judicial nominees opposed by interest groups is a strategic 
decision. While a group who opposes the policies of the appointing President may believe 
that all nominees are objectionable, it is not feasible to oppose all nominees for two main 
reasons. First, groups simply do not have the resources to oppose all nominees (another 
difference from Supreme Court nominees). Second, senators are only willing to actively 
oppose a limited number of nominees.66 This makes the limited number of nominees that 
interest groups identify as “controversial” a particularly interesting group to analyze. 
Those who study the issue of interest group opposition find the groups have vary-
ing approaches to determining which nominee to oppose. Some groups have the resources 
to investigate each nominee. Other groups rely on grassroots members to bring potential 
issues to the leaders at the national level.67 Once a group has chosen a nominee to oppose, 
it must be able to move the issue onto the agenda of senators and the public. Agenda set-
ting—a concept taken from political communication literature—is “the process by which 
problems become salient as political issues meriting the attention of the polity.”68 In 
short, interest groups must make senators believe that a particular nominee is worth part-
ing from the herd and opposing.  
Interest groups engage in three activities in hopes of moving a particular nominee 
onto the agenda. First, they distribute information to a senator’s constituents who are 
sympathetic to the interest group’s position in an attempt to harden opposition to a nomi-
nee.69 Second, groups coordinate with sympathetic citizens to build grassroots opposition   least two national interest groups. Active opposition includes op-ed pieces in newspapers as well as press releases and statements opposing a nominee. See Scherer et al., supra note 42, at 1032 and Web Appendix D; STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 199–201.  65 These calculations were based on individual nominees and not nominations. When the Senate fails to act on a nomination before the end of the Congress, the nomination lapses and is returned to the president pursuant to Senate Rule XXXI. S. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, at 16–17 (2007) (Rule XXXI), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXXI. The president must then re-nominate the individual (or nominate someone else). These subsequent re-nominations are not considered in this calculation.   66 SCHERER, supra note 32, at 131 (“[L]iberal activists firmly believe that Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee will only vote against so many judicial nominees in deference to the president. How many ‘no’ votes each senator has is a huge question mark for these groups. Accordingly, for lib-erals, yesterday’s confirmation fight directly affects tomorrow’s confirmation fight.”). 67 SCHERER, supra note 32, at 123–26. Scherer notes that the method of investigation varies among Democratic and Republican–leaning groups, with liberal groups performing assessments of each nominee and conservative groups relying on grassroots information. In addition, Scherer notes a dif-ference of defining what constitutes a “controversial” nominee based on the characteristics of the group. For example, some groups such as the conservative Judicial Selection Monitoring Project or the liberal Alliance for Justice evaluate nominees on the basis of the nominee’s “judicial philosophy.” Oth-er, more issue-specific groups, such as National Abortion Rights and Reproductive Action League or Concerned Women for America, evaluate nominees based solely on their position on a single issue (i.e., abortion).  68 Fay Lomax Cook, Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protess, Donna R. Leff & Harvey L. Molotch, Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Mak-
ers, and Policy, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 1, 16–35 (1983).  69 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nom-
inations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499, 503 (1998). 
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(or at least the appearance of grassroots opposition) to a nominee through, for example, e-
mail, letter-writing campaigns, or op-ed pieces.70 Third, groups can provide information 
directly to a senator about the nominee.71Although there is not a consensus, some groups 
have noted that direct communication with senators may not be the most effective method 
because the institutional pressure to defer to selected nominees is great.72 Instead, to move 
a nominee onto the radar of a senator, they must have active grassroots support: 
[T]o have any real impact in influencing the appointment process, it is not 
enough for elites ‘inside the Beltway’ to voice objections to the nominees 
– by posting information on their websites, publishing op-ed pieces in 
leading conservative or liberal media outlets, or lobbying politicians di-
rectly. Rather, as everyone interviewed readily conceded, it is absolutely 
critical that they also get grass-roots activists involved in the process – by 
writing letters, sending e-mails, telephoning their elected representatives, 
and in some extreme cases, organizing rallies against specific lower court 
nominees. These grass-roots activities are critical because they send mes-
sages to senators that thousands of the most mobilized constituents in their 
party object to a particular nominee, and that their critical support of that 
politician in the next election may turn on a senator’s public stance on that 
nominee.73 
Mobilizing grassroots opposition to a nominee, while necessary, is not sufficient to 
achieve a group’s goal of defeating a nominee. Interest groups also must influence how 
senators think, and get enough senators to adopt their position to defeat the nomination. 
This influence occurs through framing. Framing is the act of “selecting and highlighting 
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a 
particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.”74 From a theoretical perspective, it 
is useful to think of the framing process utilizing the cascading activation model devel-
oped by Entman.75 
The choice of how to frame a nominee is important. Ineffective depictions of nomi-
nees will be ignored and result in a waste of time, resources, and possibly goodwill with 
sympathetic senators. In addition, poorly chosen frames can isolate senators who might 
                                                                                                                                                                                     70 Id. at 503–04. 71 Id. at 504. 72 As a prominent conservative activist put it: “We [JSMP] don’t do a lot of direct lobbying from us to the senators [in order to get them to vote against a particular nominee]. It wouldn’t be effective . . . I long ago disabused myself of the notion that because Republican senators articulate the right princi-ples that there would be spontaneous combustion. That they’d do what they said they would do. It just doesn’t work. It’s too much of an insider game to just work [at defeating a nominee from] . . . in-side the Beltway.” SCHERER, supra note 32, at 127. 73Id. at 126–27 (citations omitted).  74 ROBERT M. ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER 5 (2004).  75 Id. 
Vol. 8:1]  Donald E. Campbell  
15  
otherwise support the group’s position76 Entman proposes that the most effective frames 
will be those which have high cultural resonance and magnitude and which cognitively 
trigger a preferred “schema.”77 When a schema is triggered, the feeling or ideas in the 
“knowledge network” associated with the schema come to the mind of the recipient. De-
pictions that are most effective are those which are culturally resonant—understandable, 
memorable, and emotionally charged. Magnitude, the prominence and repetition of par-
ticular words or phrases, also increases the power of the chosen depiction. The greater the 
resonance and magnitude, the more likely the frame is to evoke similar emotional associ-
ations, thoughts, and feelings.78 Take, for example, a nominee appointed by a Republican 
President. If an interest group can convincingly frame the nominee as anti-civil rights or 
homophobic—culturally congruent frames—they may be able to trigger opposition from 
sympathetic senators. A Democratic nominee could be depicted as soft on crime or in 
favor of broad abortion rights. The magnitude of the frame can be increased through the 
media or through a mobilized grassroots campaign (e.g., through fax or e-mail). On the 
other hand, a weak frame that does not have a strong cultural resonance may result in no 
or very little opposition. For example, one might expect opposition based on technical or 
procedural legal issues not to be a sufficiently strong depiction to trigger senatorial oppo-
sition. 
The process of bringing a particular schema and knowledge network into play is 
described as cascading or spreading activation.79 The goal of interest groups is to trigger 
particular thoughts and feelings to “activate” the group’s base and subsequently to moti-
vate senators to oppose a nominee. This is called a “cascading” activation model because 
the spread of frames “cascades” down from interest groups to the media, the public, and 
senators. Because initial depictions are difficult to dislodge, the initial choice of how to 
frame a nominee and the frames that are (or are not) successful are important aspects of 
the confirmation process. 
Interest groups have a particular advantage in pressing depictions because in this 
area senators are “satisficers”—willing to make decisions based on less than complete or 
optimal information.80 There are two primary reasons for this. First, for all nominees, sen-
ators simply do not have the resources or the desire to do an independent investigation 
into the nominee’s background. Second, for nominees who have previously served as 
judges, the background material is voluminous and nearly impossible for a senator or her 
staff to read and interpret.81 Therefore, senators rely on (and are susceptible to) frames                                                                                                                                                                                      76 SCHERER, supra note 32, at 128. Scherer gives the example of a controversial nominee who is framed solely on her position on abortion. Such a frame may operate to lose the votes of pro-choice Republi-can Senators, whereas a broader philosophical frame may have been more effective.  77 ENTMAN, supra note 74, at 7. Schema are “clusters or nodes of connected ideas and feelings stored in memory.”  78 Id. at 6. 79 Id. at 7. 80 See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 129, 129 (1956) (“organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not in general ‘optimize’”). 81 STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 105. Quoting a Senate staffer: “It’s knowing that the groups are doing [research] that we are able to focus our energies on other things. If they didn’t, we probably would make an effort, but we have to focus on other things the Committee does . . . .” 
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proposed by interest groups.82 Senate staffers have described the information provided by 
interest groups as “easy” and “invaluable.”83 This is particularly true for senators who are 
not members of the Judiciary Committee.84 To put this in terms of the cascading activa-
tion model, “what passes between levels of the cascade is not comprehensive understand-
ing but highlights packaged into selective, framed communications. As we go down the 
levels, the flow of information becomes less and less thorough, and increasingly limited 
to the selected highlights, processed through schemas, and then passed on in ever-cruder 
form.”85 Therefore, interest groups must present their chosen frame in such a concise and 
understandable manner (without excessive nuance or complexity) that senators can utilize 
the information to form an opinion on the nominee. 
In sum, the turn in the confirmation process from patronage-based to ideology-
based consideration has transformed the nature of the process. It has led to an increasing-
ly important role for those groups most interested in the ideological makeup of the federal 
courts. The groups select certain nominees to oppose and then attempt to move them onto 
the agenda of senators. The move onto the agenda is not automatic. Groups must use cul-
turally congruent frames and must use them often. Through the use of select depictions, 
interest groups hope senators will deviate from their tendency to vote to confirm and in-
stead actively work to defeat the targeted nominee—either through a defeat on the floor 
of the Senate or (equally as effective) by delaying a nominee so that the nominee never 
receives a vote. 
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF EXAMINING A “CONTROVERSIAL” COURT OF APPEALS NOMINEE 
To understand how interest group involvement set out in Part II operates in prac-
tice, this article presents a case study of the confirmation of Leslie H. Southwick to the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. While it is impossible to generalize from the results, the 
use of a single case study in this instance is a valid method to test a theoretical frame-
work. 86 The nature of the Southwick confirmation provides an especially good study. 
Southwick was first nominated to a district court position and passed through the Senate 
Judiciary Committee with no opposition. It was only after he was subsequently nominat-
ed to the Fifth Circuit that his nomination triggered interest group involvement. Second, 
Southwick’s nomination received a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee as 
well as an ultimately successful floor vote, eliminating the problem faced by some con-
troversial nominees who are delayed and never receive a vote by the full Senate. In addi-
tion, all sides agreed that Southwick was a well-qualified nominee, and that opposition to 
his nomination was based on his perceived ideology. Utilizing the Southwick nomination, 
this article seeks to answer three questions: (a) What frames were presented by the inter-                                                                                                                                                                                     82 Scherer, supra note 42, at 1029. See also Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: 
Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998) (interest group influence had a distinct impact on Senator voting on the nominations of Bork, Souter, and Thomas to the United States Supreme Court). 83 STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 105. 84 Id. at 106–109. 85 ENTMAN, supra note 74, at 12. 86 ALEXANDER L. GEORGE AND ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 109–24 (2005). 
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est groups who became involved in the Southwick nomination?; (b) Did the senators who 
spoke against the nomination adopt the interest group frames?; and finally, (c) What is the 
impact of this change in the confirmation process? 
Content analysis was used to determine the frames that interest groups used to op-
pose Southwick. Groups that opposed the Southwick nomination were identified through 
the Congressional Record. Although these groups can no longer testify before the Judici-
ary Committee, they often submit letters laying out their opposition. Every sentence of 
each letter of opposition submitted in the record was coded for the nature of the opposi-
tion, including the issues or concerns of each interest group. 
After identifying the frames proposed by the interest groups, the next step was to 
examine whether the senators adopted the frames. To make this determination, content 
analysis was again performed, this time on statements made during the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Each statement made by a senator was evaluated to determine whether they 
adopted the frames proposed by interest groups or whether they modified or even rejected 
the frames. 
IV. SOUTHWICK THE NOMINEE: EVALUATING INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT 
On May 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter nominated Henry Politz to a newly creat-
ed seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.87 On July 12, 1979, 
Politz was confirmed by the Senate by a voice vote with no recorded opposition. Twenty 
years later, on August 10, 1999, Judge Politz took senior status.88 This provided incoming 
President George W. Bush the opportunity to name his successor. Bush nominated 
Charles W. Pickering on May 25, 2001. At the time of the nomination, Pickering was 
serving as a federal district judge in Mississippi.89 Pickering’s circuit court nomination 
received a “well qualified” rating from the American Bar Association (ABA), but was 
immediately opposed by interest groups who accused him of being insensitive on civil 
rights issues.90 The Pickering nomination stalled in the Democratic-controlled Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, which voted three times not to move the nomination to the Senate 
floor.91                                                                                                                                                                                      87The seat was created by the Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44(a)). . 88See History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,  http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1902&cid=999&ctype (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  89Pickering was nominated to the district court by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 and unani-mously confirmed. History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,  http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1883&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na 90Adam Liptak, Judge Appointed by Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A-3. 91 CHARLES PICKERING, SUPREME CHAOS: THE POLITICS AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION & THE CULTURE WAR 9 (2005). President Bush went public to support the Pickering nomination in March 2002. Appearing at a press conference with Mike Moore, the Democratic Attorney General for Mississippi, former Demo-cratic Governor of Mississippi William Winter, and Frank W. Hunger, former Assistant Attorney Gen-eral and brother-in-law of former Vice President Al Gore, President Bush said, “I nominated a very good man from Mississippi named Charles Pickering to the appellate bench, and I expect him to be confirmed by the United States Senate. I think the country is tired of people playing politics all the time in Washington. And I believe they're holding this man's nomination up for political purposes. It's not fair, and it's not right.” Remarks During a Meeting with Judge Charles W. Pickering, Sr., and an Ex-change with Reporters, 2002 PUB. PAPERS 349 (March 6, 2002). 
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The scene changed after the mid-term elections in 2002, when Republicans took 
control of the Senate. Republican leaders claimed that the delay in confirming President 
Bush’s nominees was a contributing factor to the Democrats losing control of the Senate. 
President Bush specifically mentioned the delays while campaigning for Republican can-
didates and Senator Trent Lott’s (R-MS) press secretary said of the delays: “Clearly, it did 
not help the Democrats’ chances of either retaining control or gaining control of the Sen-
ate . . . . It backfired completely.”92 Lott himself, the new majority leader, made it clear 
that confirming Pickering and other pending nominees would be a top priority: “[W]ith 
the Senate in Republican hands, we will move decisively to confirm Judge Pickering, 
who unfortunately was bottled up in Democratic partisanship, and we will work on con-
firming other nominees as soon as possible.”93 The Pickering nomination was subse-
quently voted out of the Judiciary Committee, but stalled on the floor of the Senate, when 
Democratic senators filibustered Pickering along with a number of other Bush judicial 
nominees. 94  President Bush subsequently appointed Pickering to the bench in 2004 
through a recess appointment. Before the recess appointment came to an end (and before 
the nomination went back to the Senate), Pickering asked the President to withdraw his 
nomination. In discussing his withdrawal, Pickering blamed his defeat on “extreme spe-
cial interest groups” who were opposed to “any nominee with strong religious convic-
tions who personally disagrees with them on abortion, marriage and references to God at 
public ceremonies and institutions. These far-left groups cowed Democrat leadership into 
opposing my nomination.”95 
Bush then nominated Michael B. Wallace on February 8, 2006. Wallace, a lawyer in 
private practice in Jackson, Mississippi, served as counsel to Trent Lott during the Clin-
ton impeachment. Wallace received a “not qualified” rating from the ABA,96 and encoun-
tered opposition from some of the same groups who opposed the Pickering nomination.97 
Wallace ultimately withdrew his name from consideration for the seat in December 2006, 
after the Democrats retook control of the Senate in the 2006 mid-term elections.98 Interest 
groups on both ends of the ideological spectrum were blamed for the withdrawal of the 
Wallace nomination. Democrats, citing the nomination of Wallace (among others), argued 
that the Bush administration “seems intent on heeding the marching orders of the narrow, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     92 Audrey Hudson, GOP Set to End Judicial Backlog: Stalled Bush Nominees Face a More Welcoming 
Senate, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at A-1. 93 Id. 94 Steven G. Calabresi, Pirates We Be, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A-14. Calabresi notes that the use of the filibuster on judicial nominees was an unprecedented move: “Now for the first time in 214 years of American history a minority of senators is seeking to extend the tradition of filibustering from leg-islation to judicial nominees who they know enjoy support of a majority of the Senate. This is a change of constitutional dimensions and amounts to a kind of coup d’état.”  95 Liptak, supra note 90. 96 Gina Holland, Bush Nominee Receives "Unqualified" Rating From Lawyers Group, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 11, 2006. 97 Editorial, Help Wanted: Qualified Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A-18; Cragg Hines, W Taps An-
other Throwback for Important Appeals Seat, HOUSTON CHRON. Feb. 15, 2006, at B-11. 98 Judicial Nominee Rated Unqualified, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A-1; Robin Fitzgerald, Wallace 
Withdrawal Opens Space; Bush Can Now Select Another Nominee, THE SUN HERALD, Dec. 27, 2006, at A-6. 
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special interest groups on the right and picking fights.”99 Republicans attacked the ABA 
as a “liberal interest group” in giving Wallace an unqualified rating.100 By the time Wal-
lace withdrew, the Politz seat had been vacant for eight years and had been declared a 
“judicial emergency” by the Federal Judicial Center.  
On January 9, 2007, President Bush nominated his third choice for the seat, Leslie 
H. Southwick. Southwick did not start as a controversial court of appeals nominee. In-
stead, Southwick began his confirmation path as an uncontroversial district court nomi-
nee.101 Southwick had a distinguished career prior to the nomination. He graduated cum 
laude from Rice University and then went on to the University of Texas Law School. Af-
ter law school, he clerked for the Chief Judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
and then moved on to clerk for Judge Charles Clark on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
He then practiced law in Jackson, Mississippi; served as Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice; and was elected to the Mississippi 
Court of Appeals where he served for twelve years.102 He also served as a Judge Advocate 
General in Iraq with the Mississippi Army National Guard, authored a number of scholar-
ly articles, and taught as a professor of law at Mississippi College School of Law. South-
wick received a “Judicial Excellence” award from the Mississippi State Bar Association, 
an award voted on by lawyers. In evaluating Southwick’s qualifications for the district 
court position, the ABA rated Southwick “well qualified.” 
With very little discussion and no debate, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported 
Southwick’s district court nomination to the full Senate with a positive recommenda-
tion.103 It is likely that Southwick would have easily been confirmed as a district court 
judge if the nomination had been brought up for a vote. However, before the nomination 
was acted on, the 2006 mid-term elections gave the Democrats a majority in the Senate. 
With the Politz seat vacant, Bush withdrew Southwick’s district court nomination and 
resubmitted his name to the Fifth Circuit seat. The White House, seeking to avoid a fight 
after the Republican losses in the Senate, believed that Southwick would be an acceptable                                                                                                                                                                                      99 Judicial Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Sept. 19, 2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 100 Edward Whelan, Lowering the Bar: The Corrupt ABA Judicial Evaluation Process, WKLY. STAND., June 12, 2006.  101 152 CONG. REC. S5515 (daily ed. June 6, 2006). 102 History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3163&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na  (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 103 Ana Radelat, Judicial Candidate Enjoys Easy Going in Senate Hearing, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Sept. 20, 2006 (stating that Southwick “enjoyed a quick and cordial confirmation hearing" and that he is "ex-pected to breeze through confirmation”). The fact that Southwick faced no opposition as a district court nominee but faced substantial opposition as a court of appeals nominee provides initial evi-dence of the importance of interest group opposition. The lack of opposition was likely strategic in two ways. As discussed below, interest groups must make decisions about nominees to actively op-pose. Interest groups may choose not to actively oppose a district court nominee because that judge’s decisions are subject to review by an appellate court. Therefore, although not true for individual liti-gants, interest groups may perceive district court positions as less important or visible than court of appeals positions. Second, evaluating and opposing nominees takes resources and the ability to get the attention of Senators to support interest group opposition. Interest groups might well conclude that there is not a strong enough likelihood of triggering opposition from sympathetic senators to expend the resources necessary to oppose a court of appeals nominee.  
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(non-controversial) nominee because of his background and his recent uneventful hearing 
for the district court position.104 
The White House’s prediction proved incorrect. A number of interest groups came 
out in opposition to the Southwick nomination. These groups included, among others, 
Lambda Legal, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), Human Rights Campaign, and People for the 
American Way.105 As discussed below, these groups focused their opposition primarily on 
decisions that Southwick joined while a member of the Mississippi Court of Appeals. The 
three most-cited opinions were S.B. v. L.W.;106 Richmond v. Department of Health Ser-
vices;107 and Dubard v. Biloxi HMA.108 Because a significant amount of group opposition 
arose as a result of these cases, it is helpful to discuss these cases in some detail. 
The first case, S.B. v. L.W., was a custody dispute regarding whether the mother, 
who was bisexual, should be awarded custody of the child.109 In Mississippi, the court 
must consider several factors to determine what is in the best interest of the child before 
awarding custody.110 One of those factors is “moral fitness” of the parents.111 The Missis-
sippi Court of Appeals determined that the moral fitness factor (along with other factors 
such as financial and economic stability) weighed in favor of the father and awarded cus-
tody to him.112 Southwick joined both the majority opinion as well as a separate concur-
ring opinion. The concurrence stressed the public policy of the state regarding homosexu-
ality, noting that the state legislature enacted laws: (a) prohibiting homosexuals from                                                                                                                                                                                      104 R. Jeffrey Smith, 4 Nominees to Appeals Courts are Dropped; 32 Appointments Re-sent to Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2007, at A-03 (noting that President Bush withdrew four controversial nominees from consideration and that this “abrupt reversal” received praise from the liberal interest groups People for the American Way and Alliance For Justice for seeking “bipartisan consensus”); 153 CONG. REC. S13242 (Oct. 23, 2007) (statement of Sen. Thad Cochran) ([T]he rejection of Pickering and Wal-lace “made it clear that those judicial nominees were unacceptable. So [Senator Lott, Senator Cochran, and President Bush] put our heads together, we talked about what the other options were, and decided Leslie Southwick was the epitome of someone who had to be acceptable to the Senate.”). 105 A number of groups supported the Southwick nomination. Because this article is interested in the framing of Southwick by groups opposing his nomination, the focus is only on those groups opposing the nomination. 106 793 So. 2d 656 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). 107 No. 96-CC-00667-COA, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss. Ct. App. August 4, 1998), rev'd, 745 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1999). 108 No. 98-CA-01001-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 468 (Miss. Ct. App. July 20, 1999), rev'd 778 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 2000). 109 S.B., 793 So. 2d at 657 (noting that after the divorce, “the mother moved into a house with a wom-an. The mother testified that she was a bisexual and admitted that her relationship with the woman was intimate”). 110 The factors, which are commonly referred to as the “Albright factors,” were first set out collectively in Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983). 111 The remaining factors include: (a) age, health, and sex of child; (b) continuity of care prior to sepa-ration; (c) best parenting skills and willingness and capacity to provide primary care; (d) employ-ment and responsibilities of employment; (e) physical and mental health and age of parents; (f) emo-tional ties of parent and child; (g) home, school, and community record of child; (h) preference of child (if of sufficient age); (i) stability of the home environment and employment of parents; and (j) other relevant factors. Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005. 112 S.B., 793 So. 2d at 657. 
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adopting; (b) prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages that take place in other juris-
dictions; and (c) criminalizing sodomy.113 In addition to noting the legislation, the concur-
rence said: 
I do recognize that any adult may choose any activity in which to engage; 
however, I am also aware that such person is not thereby relieved of the 
consequences of his or her choice. It is a basic tenet that an individual’s 
exercise of freedom will not also provide an escape of the consequences 
flowing from the free exercise of such a choice. As with the present situa-
tion, the mother may view her decision to participate in a homosexual rela-
tionship as an exertion of her perceived right to do so. However, her 
choice is of significant consequence, . . . in that her rights to custody of her 
child may be significantly impacted.114 
The second case, Richmond v. Mississippi Department of Human Services,115 in-
volved the termination of Bonnie Richmond, an employee of the Mississippi Department 
of Human Services. The facts were that “on May 23, 1994 while in conference with Joyce 
Johnson . . . and Jerald Everett . . . [Richmond] referred to one of our black employees as 
‘a good ole nigger’ and . . . that upon returning to DeSoto County [Richmond] ap-
proached this black employee and referred to her using exactly the same       words . . . 
.”116 Richmond was subsequently fired for the comments and appealed the dismissal to 
the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board.117 The Board reversed the MDHS decision and 
ordered Richmond reinstated, finding that the conduct was not sufficiently egregious to 
justify termination.118 The Department then appealed the Board’s decision. The case was 
assigned to the Mississippi Court of Appeals.119 
In an opinion that Southwick joined but did not write, the Mississippi Court of Ap-
peals upheld the Board’s decision to reinstate Richmond.120 The court’s majority stressed 
the limited nature of its review, and held that the justification given for firing Richmond 
was the disruption the statement caused within the department, but the court could find no 
evidence in the record of a disruption.121 The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed to con-
sider the court of appeals decision and reversed. The supreme court held that “[u]nder the 
particular circumstances of this case, Bonnie Richmond’s use of a racial slur on a single                                                                                                                                                                                      113 Id. at 662 (Payne, J. concurring). This opinion was issued prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which declared Texas’ law criminalizing sodomy unconstitutional. 114 Id. at 663 (Payne, J. concurring). 115 Richmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 96-CC-00667-COA, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1998). 116 Id. at *5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 117 Id. at *1–2. 118 Id. at *1. 119 Under the Mississippi system, a case is originally appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the court then assigns certain cases to the Mississippi Court of Appeals. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-4-3(1) (West 2011) (“The Court of Appeals shall have the power to determine or otherwise dispose of any appeal or other proceeding assigned to it by the Supreme Court.”). 120 Richmond, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 637, at *1. 121 Id. at *16–17. 
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occasion does not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment, and therefore 
does not warrant dismissal of her from employment with DHS. However, we remand this 
matter back to the Employee Appeals Board for the imposition of a lesser penalty, or to 
make detailed findings on the record why no penalty should be imposed.”122 
The final case is Dubard v. Biloxi HMA. The Dubard case involved an employee 
who sued a prospective employer for withdrawing a job offer after the employee failed a 
drug test that was a condition of employment.123 The Mississippi Court of Appeals, over a 
dissent by Judge Southwick, determined that the employee presented enough facts re-
garding breach of an employment contract or the possible right to equitable relief that it 
was inappropriate to dismiss the case on summary judgment.124 Southwick’s dissent ar-
gued that Mississippi is an employment-at-will state and that Dubard’s claim would fail 
for that reason: “I find that employment at will, for whatever flaws a specific application 
may cause, is not only the law of Mississippi but it provides the best balance of the com-
peting interests in the normal employment situation.”125 After the court of appeals’ deci-
sion, the employer sought review by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court agreed to 
hear the case, reversed the court of appeals and (adopting the position taken by South-
wick in dissent), dismissed the employee’s claim.126 
These cases provide context as to how various interest groups framed their opposi-
tion to Southwick. Importantly, the cases were not utilized to discuss legal process (e.g., 
the proper standard of review for agency decisions). Instead, each of these cases were 
cited for a broader principle or frame. For example, S.B. was presented to demonstrate 
opposition to gay rights, Richmond was presented as evidence of Southwick’s insensitivi-
ty to civil rights, and Dubard was cited as proof that Southwick favored business interests 
over employees. To demonstrate this use of case-as-frame, Figure 2 provides a break-
down of the nature of the opposition to Southwick by national interest groups.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     122 Richmond v. Miss. Dep't of Human Serv., 745 So. 2d 254, 258 (Miss. 1999). 123Dubard v. Biloxi H.M.A., No. 1998-CA-01001-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 468, at *2-5 (Miss. Ct. App. Jul. 20, 1999). 124Id. at *11. 125Id. at *16 (Southwick, P.J., dissenting). 126Dubard v. Biloxi H.M.A., 778 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 2000).  
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Figure 2. Issues Identified by Interest Groups 
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National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force 71.4% -- -- -- -- 28.6% 
NAACP (national chapter) -- 47.8% -- 26.1% -- 26.1% 
People for the American Way 26% 33.8% 12% 1.4% -- 26.8% 
Human Rights 
Campaign 92.6% -- -- -- -- 7.4% 
Community Rights 
Counsel et al128 -- -- -- -- 84.2% 15.8% 
International Union129 -- 20% 50% -- -- 20% 
National Council of 
Jewish Women 9.1% 54.5% -- 9.1% -- 27.3% 
National Employment 
Lawyers Association -- 48% 36% -- -- 16% 
National Partnership for 
Women & Families 15.6% 71.9% 9.4% -- -- 15.6% 
Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights 13.8% 55.2% 17.2% -- -- 13.8 
National Organization for 
Women -- 12.5% 12.5% -- -- 75% 
Jewish Alliance for Law and 
Social Action 16.7% 33.3% -- -- -- 50% 
Legal Momentum 33.3% 38.9% -- -- 5.6% 22.2%                                                                                                                                                                                      127 This column includes other either miscellaneous or neutral statements. For example, a number of letters include, as the first few sentences, introductory or background information about theirganizations, which are coded as “other” (even if they note that the organization opposes the nomination). In addition, some groups commented that the record was incomplete, citing to the need for un-published records. These statements were also included in this column. 128 This letter was filed jointly by the Community Rights Counsel; Earthjustice; Friends of the Earth; Sierra Club; Endangered Habitats League; Louisiana Bayoukeeper, Inc.; Louisiana Environmental Action Network; San Francisco Baykeeper; Texas Campaign for the Environment; and Valley Watch, Inc. 129 This letter was filed jointly by the International Union and United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America. 
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These frames are consistent with the first level of the cascading activation model of 
framing. Interest groups attempted to trigger specific ideological cognitive schema and 
associate them with Southwick. Frames adopted against Southwick—especially race and 
sexual identity—have particularly strong cultural resonance. Also, note that interest 
groups tended to reiterate the same opposition frames, thereby increasing the magnitude 
of the frames. Based on interest group frames, if confirmed, Southwick’s decisions could 
be expected: (a) with regard to civil rights, to oppose civil rights plaintiffs; (b) with re-
gard to employer/employee relations, to oppose the employee; (c) in civil litigation, to 
favor the defendant over the plaintiff; and (d) in criminal prosecutions, to favor the gov-
ernment over the criminal defendant.  
It should be noted that the Southwick nomination provided a unique, non-
ideological opposition. Groups, such as the NAACP, cited the lack of diversity on the 
Fifth Circuit as a reason for opposing Southwick. Derrick Johnson, President of the Mis-
sissippi Chapter of the NAACP, set out this line of opposition: 
[T]he Southwick nomination does nothing to ameliorate the egregious 
problem with the lack of diversity on Mississippi’s federal bench. Missis-
sippi has the highest African-American population of any state (36%). Yet 
there has never been an African-American appointed to represent Missis-
sippi on the Fifth Circuit . . . President Bush has made ten nominations to 
the federal bench in Mississippi—district and appellate. None were Afri-
can American. This is extremely disturbing to many Mississippians, who 
believe the State should be fairly represented on the federal bench.130 
While this presents a frame based on race, it is not directed explicitly at Southwick’s per-
ceived ideology or decision–making.  
As discussed in Part II (D), merely framing a nominee is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition for interest group success. If the frames are not sufficiently culturally 
congruent or they lack sufficient magnitude, the frame will fail to modify senators’ pre-
sumption-of-confirmation behavior. For frames to be effective, they must move the op-
posed nominee (Southwick) onto the senator’s agenda, and must prompt senators to adopt 
the group’s preferred frame. To determine the success of interest groups in agenda setting 
and framing in the Southwick context, the next step is to evaluate what occurred in the 
senators’ expressed opposition to the nomination. 
The hearing on the Southwick nomination was held on May 10, 2007, before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.131 The hearing was chaired by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse 
(D-RI). Other members of the Judiciary Committee who were present included Edward 
Kennedy (D-Mass), Russell Feingold (D-Wis), Richard Durbin (D-Ill), Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), Sam Brownback (R-Kan), and Tom Coburn (R-Okl). Chair of the Committee, Pat-
rick Leahy (D-Vt), was not present at the hearing but submitted comments for the record. 
The hearings began with Southwick’s introduction and statements of support from both 
                                                                                                                                                                                     130 153 CONG. REC. S13245 (Oct. 23, 3007) (Letter from Derrick Johnson to Sens. Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter). 131 Nominations of Leslie Southwick, to Be Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit; Janet T. Neff, to be District 
Judge for the Western District of Michigan; and Liam O'Grady, to be District Judge for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007).  
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Mississippi senators, Thad Cochran and Trent Lott.132 They both stressed Southwick’s 
qualifications and background and encouraged a quick confirmation. 
 After a short introductory statement by Southwick, Senator Whitehouse began the 
questioning. He first asked a question about Southwick’s position on the separation of 
powers and the court’s role in it. After a short answer (“I believe separation of powers [is] 
vital. It’s part of how this country is structured, how this country’s government has been 
organized.”),133 Whitehouse then asked about the S.B. v. L.W. decision: “There has been 
some controversy about a decision that you did not author, but signed onto, both in the 
main opinion and the concurring opinion, S.B. v. L.W. that involved a woman who was 
gay and who was seeking custody of her daughter. Because that has been a matter of 
some controversy, I looked at the decision myself.”134 He questioned the use of the phrase 
“homosexual lifestyle” in the opinion—noting that it was derogatory—and stated that a 
gay person coming before a judge who had joined in an opinion using that term may feel 
that they could not get a fair hearing.135 Southwick responded that he joined the concur-
ring opinion in the case because he felt it emphasized the legislative position at that time 
on gay rights issues. He also noted that some of the analysis would be different now, after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Southwick sought to assure the Sena-
tor that all who appeared before his court would receive a fair hearing and be treated with 
respect.136 
The next Democratic senator to question Southwick was Senator Feingold. 
Feingold began his questioning with the Richmond case and the statement in the opinion 
that the decision to fire the employee was “not motivated by racial hatred or animosity.”137 
Southwick responded: “To me, that case was about the review standard and the deference 
that is given to administrative agencies. It was a tough case.”138 Senator Feingold then 
moved to S.B. The Senator and nominee had the following exchange that provides some 
insight into the type of questions that were raised regarding the case: 
Senator Feingold: Do you believe that one of the consequences of having 
a same-sex relationship should be to risk losing custody of your own 
child? 
Southwick: I think, if the law I’m supposed to apply says that, then my 
hands are tied. If you’re talking to me generally as a policy matter, I don’t 
think that’s my realm. But I will say . . . the legal landscape in 2001 was 
Bowers v. Hardwick, which says there was no privacy interest, liberty in-
terest in even private homosexual relations. In 2003, there became such a 
recognized right and that changes the analysis, at least, and may well 
change the outcome. 
***                                                                                                                                                                                      132 Id. at 3–5 (statements of Sens. Thad Cochran and Trent Lott). 133 Id. at 45 (statement of Leslie Southwick). 134 Id. (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse). 135 Id. at 46 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse). 136 Id. at 46–47 (statement of Leslie Southwick). 137 Id. at 51–52 (statement of Sen. Feingold). 138 Id. at 52 (statement of Leslie Southwick). 
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Senator Feingold: Do you believe that gay, lesbian, bisexual and 
transgendered Americans are entitled to equal protection of the laws? 
Southwick: Well, I think everyone is entitled to be treated fairly. If you 
are talking about, as a fundamental right, I think the law is evolving as to 
where the fundamental rights regarding gay relationship exist. And I will 
apply the law rationally, reasonably, and the fairest reasoning and reading 
that I can make of the precedents that control.139 
At the end of this exchange, Feingold asked Southwick if he would disassociate himself 
from either the Richmond or S.B. opinions. Southwick responded: “Stand by them. I be-
lieve the Richmond opinion was correct. I didn’t write it. I joined the concurrence . . . . If 
you say I’m endorsing everything in an opinion that I did not write every word, every 
phrase, I do not.”140 
After Feingold, Senator Kennedy questioned Southwick about the Richmond case 
as well, and whether Southwick would write a separate opinion in the case if he could go 
back. Southwick replied that he applied the law as he interpreted it and that he would not 
change his approach to the case.141 
Senator Durbin followed Kennedy. His questioning was wide ranging—beginning 
with questions regarding the Federalist Society and whether Southwick could “point to an 
example . . . where you really stepped out and subjected yourself to criticism for taking 
an unpopular view on behalf of the dispossessed.”142 He also addressed the lack of mi-
nority representation on the Fifth Circuit: 
It is my understanding that President Bush has submitted 10 nominees for 
the Federal bench in Mississippi, 7 at the District level, 3 at the Fifth Cir-
cuit, and not one has been African American. Mississippi being a state 
with more than a third of the population African-American, you can un-
derstand why the African-American population feels that this is a recurring 
pattern which does not indicate an effort to find balance on the court when 
it comes to racial composition, or even to give African-Americans a 
chance in this situation. But having said that, I believe you have the right 
to be judged on your own merits in terms of your own nomination . . . .143 
Durbin then asked about the Richmond case explicitly and queried whether Southwick 
could understand why some would consider the decision a sign of insensitivity. South-
wick responded that he could understand the aversion to the use of the word and that 
“there is no worst word.”144 
The Republicans on the Committee spoke in favor of Southwick. It would be ex-
pected that these senators would seek to either negate the frames raised by Democratic 
senators or attempt to reframe the debate surrounding the nomination. That is exactly                                                                                                                                                                                      139 Id. at 53–54. 140 Id. at 54 (statement of Leslie Southwick). 141 Id. at 55–56 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 142 Id. at 59 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 143 Id. at 57–58 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 144Id. at 60 (statement of Leslie Southwick). 
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what happened. Senator Hatch, attempting to shift the frame from ideological issues to 
competence, stressed Southwick’s “well qualified” rating by the ABA: 
The ABA says that [well qualified] means that you have qualities such as, 
and I’m quoting here from their published criteria, “compassion, open-
mindedness, freedom from bias, and commitment to equal justice under 
law.” Now, no one has ever, to my knowledge, accused the ABA of having 
a conservative bias. So when the most exhaustive evaluation of your rec-
ord shows that you are open-minded, free from bias, and committed to 
equal justice, I am baffled by some of the more far-left groups who look at 
just a few cases and consider only the result of those few cases, and then 
pronounce that you are controversial and your record is troubling, or that 
you favor certain interests over others.145 
Senator Hatch also attempted to shift the frame from that of a nominee constantly oppos-
ing a particular ideological viewpoint, to frame Southwick as a nominee who had been 
involved in approximately 7000 opinions while serving on the Mississippi Court of Ap-
peals and who had separately authored between 800 and 850 opinions, with interest 
groups picking very few of those to inappropriately characterize how Southwick would 
decide cases.146 
This overview of Southwick’s hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee pro-
vides empirical support for the model set out in Part II. Every Democratic senator who 
spoke overwhelmingly adopted the arguments and concerns of interest groups in their 
questioning. The hearing demonstrated that with regard to the Southwick nomination, not 
only did interest groups sound the “fire alarm” with regard to the nomination, but they 
also successfully framed and activated opposition to the nomination.  
After the Judiciary Committee hearing, there was no certainty that the nomination 
would be successfully voted out of Committee to the floor of the Senate. In fact, the 
Committee vote occurred on August 2, 2007—more than three months after the hearing 
and seven months after Southwick’s nomination. Interest groups opposing the confirma-
tion moved their opposition to the media. This is consistent with the cascading activation 
model. Media coverage reinforces the interest group’s preferred frames and, because the 
media provides additional voices to the fray, it also increases the frame’s magnitude. 
The New York Times published an editorial opposing the nomination on June 5, 
2007, quoting the position of the Mississippi Magnolia Bar Association (an organization 
of African-American Mississippi lawyers): “‘We question whether Judge Southwick will 
properly enforce the law when it comes to the rights of those who are unpopular and who 
are marginalized by the political process.’”147 The editorial then discussed the Richmond 
case and claimed that the opinion demonstrated a “thorough lack of understanding of the 
odious impact of such language.” Chiding Southwick for joining the S.B. concurrence, 
the editorial goes on to say: “[I]t would be hard for a black person with a discrimination 
case, or a gay person with a family law issue, to have any confidence that Judge South-
wick would treat them fairly . . . . Judge Southwick’s judicial record also shows the usual                                                                                                                                                                                      145 Id. at 47–48 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 146 Id. at 47 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 147 Editorial, An Unacceptable Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at A-1. 
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pattern of President Bush’s judicial nominees: insensitivity toward workers, consumers 
and people injured by corporations.”148 The Washington Post also ran an article on June 
10, 2007, opposing the Southwick nomination—relying explicitly on information provid-
ed by groups such as the Alliance for Justice and People for the American Way to ques-
tion Southwick’s “problematic record on civil rights that strongly suggested he may lack 
the commitment to social justice progress.”149 
The August 7 vote in the Judiciary Committee was tense and uncertain, a far cry 
from the consensus decision that occurs without such opposition. In fact, when asked the 
day before the hearing whether the Southwick nomination would be voted out of the Ju-
diciary Committee, Chair of the Committee Patrick Leahy said: “I have no idea.” 150 
Southwick was ultimately voted out of the Committee by a vote of 10–9—with Senator 
Diane Feinstein (D-Cal) breaking with her Democratic colleagues to cast the deciding 
vote in favor of Southwick. Before casting her vote, Senator Feinstein read a prepared 
statement. She said that she had lengthy conversations with Southwick and received a 
written response to the Richmond decision. She concluded: “What emerged was an ap-
preciation on my part that Judge Southwick is a qualified, circumspect person . . . . I 
don’t believe he’s a racist. I don’t believe I’m a racist. I believe he made a mistake.”151 
She also said that her decision was based on the fact that the decisions in question were 
not written by Southwick.152 Finally, she noted that the ABA had given Southwick its 
highest rating, and that the seat was determined to be a “judicial emergency” by the Fed-
eral Judicial Conference.153 
Feinstein’s Judiciary Committee vote brought instant condemnation from interest 
groups that had opposed the Southwick nomination. Nan Aron, president of Alliance for 
Justice, said: “[The vote on Southwick] was a test of whether Democrats were up to the 
task of applying scrutiny to Bush’s judicial nominees.”154 Becky Dansky of the National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force said that gay and lesbian Californians “are not going to be 
silent about [the Feinstein vote].”155 A letter to the editor in the San Francisco Chronicle, 
citing the position of the Human Rights Campaign, says Feinstein “again showed her true 
colors when she broke from her party . . . and cast the tie-breaking vote in favor of the 
nomination of Leslie Southwick . . . .”156 As discussed in Part II (C), senators run a poten-
tial electoral risk when they ignore the positions of interest groups. These statements pro-
vide direct evidence of why senators are susceptible to the frames of interest groups that 
can motivate the senator’s base. Failure to adhere to the frames can, at a minimum, result 
in bad press and, at the worst, compromise possible reelection. 
After the vote in the Judiciary Committee, the nomination moved to the full Senate, 
and was placed on the calendar for October 24, 2007. On the floor it faced two significant 
veto points. The first was the possibility of a filibuster. In order to end debate on the nom-                                                                                                                                                                                     148Id. 149 Robert Barnes & Michael Abramowitz, Conservatives Worry About Court Vacancies, WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at A4. 150 Erin P. Billings, Southwick May Eke Out Win Today, ROLL CALL, Aug. 2, 2007. 151 153 CONG. REC. S13249-51 (Oct. 23, 2007).  152 Id. 153 Id. 154 Bob Egelko, Feinstein Draws Fire Over Vote for Judge, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 4, 2007, at B-1. 155 Id. 156 Letter to the Editor, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 7, 2007, at D-10. 
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ination, a motion was brought to the floor to end cloture. Debate on the cloture motion 
takes up twenty-seven pages of the Congressional Record. The debate centered on the 
same arguments and cases that were examined in the Judiciary Committee hearings. For 
example, every senator who spoke against the nomination cited or referenced the Rich-
mond case. In addition, seventy-one percent (five out of seven) of senators mentioned the 
S.B. v. L.W. case. Only one senator mentioned the Dubard case in expressing opposition. 
Importantly, while the same frames were utilized in the debate, how these frames 
were utilized varied. Recall that the cascading activation model predicts that as the 
frames flow/cascade down from interest groups to the public/media, to the senators, how 
the frame is perceived and used will become more blunted and less nuanced. In the con-
firmation context, another layer can be added to the levels of the cascade—whether the 
senator is a member of the Judiciary Committee. 
Members of the Judiciary Committee tended to demonstrate a more nuanced under-
standing of the cases and arguments utilized against the nomination. On the other hand, 
senators who were not members of the Committee tended to utilize more absolute state-
ments. For example, Senator Boxer stated (after referencing the facts of the Richmond 
and S.B. cases but never mentioning them by name): “I am deeply disappointed that Pres-
ident Bush has once again attempted to fill the Fifth Circuit vacancy with a nominee 
holding views far to the right of most Americans . . . .”157 Senator Menendez stated that 
he opposed Southwick because of his “long and consistent history of insensitivity toward 
discrimination and of siding with the powerful against the powerless . . . .”158He went on 
to say: “He will be the type of judge who consistently rules in favor of big business and 
corporate interests at the expense of workers’ rights and consumer rights . . . . What I do 
know is that he interprets the law in a way that is not blind to color, blind to race, in fact, 
focuses on these factors and sides against them.”159 Senator Reid stated: “As a member of 
the Mississippi State appellate court, Judge Southwick joined decisions that demonstrate 
insensitivity to, and disinterest in, the cause of civil rights.”160 Finally, Senator Clinton 
stated: “His tenure as a judge on the Mississippi Court of Appeals reveals a record that 
fails to honor the principles of equality and justice and demonstrates a disregard for civil 
rights.”161 
The point here is not that this type of blunt opposition is insincere, but that it is the 
result of information received from and filtered through interest groups. It is satisficing 
by these senators and results in a particular view of a nominee that is shaped strongly by 
interest group frames. On the other hand, members of the Judiciary Committee, while still 
adopting interest group frames, have the opportunity to explore nuance with the nominee, 
which tends to be reflected in debates.  
When the vote was taken on the cloture motion, it passed by a margin of 62 to 35, 
with twelve Democrats voting in favor of ending debate.162 After the vote on the cloture 
motion, the next step was to vote on the nomination itself (another potential veto point). 
Southwick was ultimately confirmed by a vote of 59 to 38.163                                                                                                                                                                                      157 153 CONG. REC. S13242 (Oct. 23, 2007). 158 153 CONG. REC. S13274 (Oct. 24, 2007). 159 Id. 160 153 CONG. REC. S13299 (Oct. 24, 2007). 161 153 CONG. REC. S13300 (Oct. 24, 2007). 162 Id. 163 Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  [2012  
30  
 In sum, the influence of interest groups on the trajectory of the confirmation of 
Southwick is undeniable. The uncontroversial district court nominee became a highly 
controversial court of appeals nominee, because interest groups became involved in the 
process. Not only did the interest groups delay the confirmation, but their frames also 
dictated the terms of the debate. These frames were particularly strong for those senators 
who were not members of the Judiciary Committee. 
V. EVALUATING INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
The confirmation battle over the nomination of Leslie Southwick provides a 
glimpse into the current confirmation process for court of appeals judges. This article 
confirms the increasingly important role interest groups play. These groups determine 
which nominees will be deemed controversial and shape the debate surrounding these 
nominees by selecting the frames through which opposed nominees will be evaluated.  
The case study has a larger importance as well. The study exposes trends that will 
continue to impact the confirmation process for the foreseeable future. It is important to 
note that these trends are institutional and not partisan. As such, the influence of interest 
groups on the confirmation process will hold regardless of the party holding the Senate 
majority.164 
The most important impact of interest group involvement is at the level of individ-
ual senators. Consider the Senate of the 1950s versus the Senate of today. The historic 
Senate was an “encapsulated men’s club” in which norms, such as senatorial courtesy and 
apprenticeship, were respected and followed.165 As one scholar succinctly put it, in the 
Senate of the 1950s, “the unwritten but well-understood rules of conduct virtually guaran-
teed that such potentially polarizing issues as the appointment of judges would not be 
permitted to disrupt the orderly flow of Senate business.”166 Senators were willing to 
abide by the Senate “folkway” of senatorial courtesy and forego individual institutional 
rights because they collectively believed that individual members would be better off 
abiding by the norms.167 
Recall that the senatorial courtesy norm calls for non-home-state senators to defer 
to the opinion of a home-state senator regarding a judicial nominee. Such deference is 
exercised with the expectation that senators will respect the non-home-state senator’s                                                                                                                                                                                      164 See Editorial, Breaking Faith: A Politically Driven Filibuster of a Sound Judicial Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at A22 (discussing Republican filibuster of President Obama’s nomination of Goodwin Liu to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 165 BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 1 (1989) (quoting Nelson W. Polsby, 
Transformation of the American Political System 1950-1980, paper delivered to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (1981)). 166 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 132. 167 Donald R. Matthews, The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Leg-
islative Effectiveness, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1064, 1064 (1959) (defining Senate “folkways” as “unwrit-ten but generally accepted and informally enforced norms of conduct in the chamber”). See also SINCLAIR, supra note 165, at 21. Sinclair equates the decision by individual senators to forego their institutional powers and abide by norms as fitting into a prisoner’s dilemma game theoretic model: “Conformity involved some cost to the individual, but by and large, if everyone conformed, everyone was better off. Widespread conformity with the norms provided direct benefits to senators in terms of their individual goals. The norms may also have contributed to the institution’s ability to perform its functions, but in no case did mutual cooperation have only an institutional payoff.” 
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choice of nominee when a vacancy occurs in that senator’s state. This norm continued as 
long as the cost of conforming to the norm was less than the cost of not conforming.168 
With the introduction of interest groups into the process, the calculus changed. Now the 
costs that interest groups can impose are perceived to be greater than the benefit received 
from adhering to the senatorial courtesy norm. As a result, the norm gives way, and sena-
tors begin to exercise their individual institutional powers. It is thus not surprising that 
senators have been willing to delay and filibuster judicial nominees that would historical-
ly have gone through unopposed with the support of home-state senators (e.g., South-
wick). 
Senators recognize the implications of rejecting senatorial courtesy. In the South-
wick debate, Senator Hatch noted the “tradition” of respecting the opinion of the home- 
state senators and urged senators not to “veer from that path.”169 Senator Lott noted the 
reasons for adhering to the norm: “Home State Senators are uniquely positioned to know 
the personalities, qualifications, and reputations of the nominees from their state. The fact 
that this traditional courtesy is being ignored should be cause for concern for every Sena-
tor in this Chamber.”170 
This is not to say that the loss of the norm of senatorial courtesy is a negative de-
velopment. Opening the judicial confirmation process to debate is certainly more demo-
cratic than a nominee being selected in an efficient, closed system in which patronage is 
the primary consideration.171 Outside involvement can expose legitimate concerns about a 
nominee that might not otherwise be brought to light.172 In addition, with the increasing 
importance of the federal courts in interpreting and determining issues of public policy, a 
more vigorous debate over individual nominees can and should be expected.173 As one 
scholar noted: “[I]t is practically impossible to distinguish between judicial contributions 
to the governmental process and legislative contributions. It is accordingly perfectly logi-
cal to demand that judicial personnel be subjected to the same test of fitness as legislative 
personnel.”174 
The problem, however, as demonstrated by the Southwick case, is twofold. First, 
the involvement of interest groups may not lead to more substantive debate. Instead, es-                                                                                                                                                                                     168 SINCLAIR, supra note 165, at 22. 169 153 CONG. REC. S13289 (Oct. 24, 2007) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 170 153 CONG. REC. S13253 (Oct. 23, 2007) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott). 171 In discussing the appointment process to agencies during the Nixon presidency, Ronald Moe notes that active senatorial involvement serves the purpose of “keeping communications open between the two branches of government” and serves as a reminder to the President of the Senate’s involvement in the process. Ronald C. Moe, Senate Confirmation of Executive Appointments: The Nixon Era, 32 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 141, 152 (1975). 172 Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988) (discussing the role of the press and groups such as the ABA in identifying issues with Supreme Court nominees that would not have been revealed otherwise). 173 This belief that the changing role of the federal judiciary justifies a more intrusive inquiry is not new. In 1934, Professor Kenneth C. Cole observed: “The net result of these developments [i.e., the changing role of federal courts] is substantial identity between the sort of considerations to which particular legislators address themselves in dealing with public questions, and the considerations particular judges act upon. This means that the Senate should not be deprived of a substantial voice in the selection of judicial personnel.” Kenneth C. Cole, Judicial Affairs: The Role of the Senate in the 
Confirmation of Judicial Nominations, 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 875, 893 (1934). 174 Id. at 892. 
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pecially for senators who are not members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the debate 
consists largely of un-nuanced characterizations of a nominee’s positions that mimic in-
terest group frames. Second, the individualistic nature of the Senate provides individual 
senators numerous opportunities to delay (and possibly defeat) a nominee who would 
otherwise have majority support in the Senate if granted a vote, raising concerns about 
the undemocratic nature of the process. 
So what does the changing nature of the process portend for the future of confirma-
tions? It means that regardless of the fact that both Democratic and Republican senators 
give lip service to the need to change the politicized nature of the system, nothing will 
change as long as satisfying interest groups provides a greater electoral benefit than not 
opposing or delaying a nominee.175 If the process is to be modified—to alleviate delay or 
to change the nature of the debate—the Senate as a whole must act to alter the rules of 
how nominees to lower federal courts are handled.176 This will require adopting a process 
that respects the power of individual senators and at the same time modifies the process 
to limit the current number of veto points. In other words, the process should be struc-
tured so that the Senate acts through a structured evaluative process as opposed to a polit-
icized free-for-all process. For example, the Senate could impose enforceable time limits 
for a nominee to receive a hearing and vote in the Judiciary Committee. It could do the 
same once a nominee reaches the floor of the Senate. A final possibility is the so-called 
“nuclear option,” which would end the ability of senators to filibuster judicial nominees 
who reach the floor of the Senate. None of these changes impacts the ability of a senator 
to inquire into a nominee’s position on issues or to oppose a nominee based on political 
or personal grounds. However, changes such as this would provide procedural certainty to 
the process and ultimately ensure an up-or-down vote on the nominee.   
The fact that members believe they obtain more benefits from exercising their indi-
vidual power as a senator than in achieving consensus, means that agreements such as 
that reached by the “Gang of 14” during the George W. Bush administration will not and 
cannot hold. The “Gang of 14” arose when Democrats filibustered certain President Bush 
nominees based on their perceived conservative ideology, and fourteen senators (seven 
from each party) broke the filibuster and agreed in the future to only filibuster judicial 
nominees under “extraordinary circumstances.”177 Because interest group pressure will 
trump such informal agreements in the current political environment, they are doomed to 
fail. The only way that agreements to determine the substantive qualifications of a nomi-
nee will be successful is if an objective (and likely largely administrative) method for 
determining what is meant by a “qualified” nominee, and a method of enforcing the                                                                                                                                                                                      175 Senator Jon Kyl recognized this fact in discussing the Southwick nomination: “I suggest today’s vote is a watershed. If Senate Democrats decide to filibuster Judge Southwick today, a clearly qualified nominee, they should not be surprised if they see similar treatment for Democratic nominees. This cannot be a one-sided standard. So this isn’t just a vote about Judge Southwick; it is about the future of the judicial nomination process. If Leslie Southwick cannot get an up-or-down vote, then I suspect no Senator should expect a future Democratic or Republican president to be able to count on their nominees not to be treated in the same fashion. Any little bit of controversy could be created to create the kind of hurdles Judge Southwick is facing today.” 153 CONG. REC. S13280 (Oct. 24, 2007). 176 This recommendation does not include consideration of Supreme Court Justices. Because of the rare and visible nature of the debate over these positions, such institutional changes are largely un-necessary. 177 Republican senators had threatened to eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominees—what Sena-tor Trent Lott called the “nuclear option.” 
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agreement against recalcitrant senators, is adopted. These types of evidence-limiting rules 
are very unlikely because they would significantly limit the power of an individual sena-
tor. Unsurprisingly, the “Gang of 14” agreement has not held in the Obama Administra-
tion.178 
If institutional rules are not put in place with regard to judicial nominees, it is very 
likely that the confirmation process will devolve into tit-for-tat political fights over nomi-
nations which harm both the Senate and the federal courts. This is precisely what appears 
to be happening. When questions arise about delay in confirmation of judicial nominees, 
the common response is to focus on how nominees were treated under prior administra-
tions.179 There is an inevitable race to the bottom aspect to this approach, where each suc-
cessive change in administration justifies acting on fewer nominees because of the ac-
tions of prior administrations. If interest group involvement continues to increase and 
senators are pressured to oppose more nominees, the problem will be exacerbated. In ad-
dition, with the increasing homogeneity and partisanship of both parties, there is a de-
creasing number of “partisan non-conformists” or those “moderate and cross-pressured 
members . . . who have policy preferences outside the ideological mainstream of their 
party.”180 This means that not only will “Gang of 14”-type agreements not hold, they are 
less likely to arise in the future because of the decreasing moderates in both parties. 
Such battles have substantive negative impacts on the judiciary. The obvious impli-
cation of delayed and defeated nominees is a reduction in the number of judges sitting on 
a court to hear and decide cases. This can increase the time it takes to have a case re-
solved, impacting both those parties litigating before federal courts as well as the judges 
(and staff members) operating under increased workloads.181 Indirectly, the nature of the 
process can also impact the individuals who are willing to be considered for a judicial 
position. The most qualified candidates may be hesitant to accept a nomination, knowing 
how contentious the process has become. In fact, Justice Scalia has been outspoken in his 
belief that the current confirmation process has negatively impacted the makeup of the 
courts of appeal.182 Because of the increasing caseload in the federal courts and the fact 
that federal judges serve for life, the consequences of a highly politicized and uncertain 
confirmation process can have a long-term impact on the federal courts.                                                                                                                                                                                      178 See Editorial, Judicial Filibuster: Not so ‘Extraordinary’ After All, BALT. SUN, Dec. 8, 2011, at A-18 (“Remember the ‘Gang of 14’? That was the bipartisan group of senators who six years ago agreed not to filibuster judicial nominees except under ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ Well, looks like some peo-ple have decided to redefine ‘extraordinary’ to include ‘politically convenient.’”); see also Editorial, 
supra note 164. 179 STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 56-65 (discussing the prevalence of the “retaliatory” use of senatori-al courtesy). 180 Richard Fleisher & John R. Bond, The Shrinking Middle in the U.S. Congress, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 429, 429–30 (2004). 181 Chief Justice John Roberts addressed this concern in his 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal Ju-diciary: “Over many years . . . a persistent problem has developed in the process of filling judicial va-cancies. Each political party has found it easy to turn on a dime from decrying to defending the block-ing of judicial nominations, depending on their changing political fortunes. This has created acute difficulties for some judicial districts. Sitting judges in those districts have been burdened with ex-traordinary caseloads . . . There remains an urgent need for the political branches to find a long-term solution to this recurring problem.” John G. Roberts, Jr., 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 7–8 (Dec. 31, 2010) http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx. 182 Hearings, supra note 1, at 25, 36 (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 Trent Lott, who spoke about the impact of interest groups after the Southwick 
confirmation debate, commented that “America didn’t elect advocacy groups to any-
thing.”183 The findings of this article indicate that while this may be true, interest groups 
have recently assumed a significant role in the confirmation process. These groups de-
termine which court of appeals nominees will see opposition, and propose frames that 
senators adopt in debating a nominee. Their influence shifts the incentive calculus inside 
the Senate, causing senators to abandon the norm of senatorial courtesy for a more parti-
san process. 
If the current confirmation process was born of the increase in interest group in-
volvement and the shifting of senators’ preferences, what can be done to prompt change? 
The answer is that change must come from within the Senate itself. Because the current 
preference structure will lead senators to exercise their institutional powers of delay in an 
attempt to defeat a nominee, the only certain method to change this process is to adopt 
rules and procedures that limit senators’ power to obstruct nominees. The current system 
will inevitably lead to more partisan battles over nominees, which will ultimately have an 
impact not only on a growing Senate stalemate over confirmation of federal judges, but 
also on an understaffed court whose integrity has been compromised by bruising partisan 
confirmation fights. As Senator Hatch aptly put it while discussing the confirmation of 
Supreme Court justices: “political involvement in the selection of judges is a two-edged 
sword whose backswing has the potential to injure the prestige and independence of the 
Court as much as or more than its thrusts have the chance to reshape jurisprudential direc-
tions.”184 In other words, while confirmation-as-political-battle may be to the short- term 
advantage of senators, the long-term damage to the institutional integrity of the judiciary 
could be the unintended yet alarming consequence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     183 Trent Lott, A Vote for Statesmanship, TIMES STONE CNTY. S. MISS., Nov. 1, 2007, at A4, http://www.timesstonecounty.com/PDF/2007/11-01-07//page4a.pdf.  184 Orrin G. Hatch, Book Review: Save The Court from What?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1352 (1986). See 
also Richard D. Freidman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 95 YALE L. J. 1283, 1317 (1986) (“Extended debates, both within the Senate and beyond, concerning re-cent decisions and the political philosophy of a nominee cannot help but diminish the Court's reputa-tion as an independent institution and impress upon the public—and indeed on the Court itself—a political perception of its role.”); Rader, supra note 8, at 814(“[I]f nominations [are] to be decided on the basis of what the public can be made to believe about a nominee's judicial philosophy, the notion of a federal judiciary detached from influences of public opinion and political pressure may be affect-ed.”). 
